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January
5, 2002
Edward
Said
Is
Israel More Secure Now?
January
4, 2002
CG Estabrook
Anti-War
= Anti-Globalization
Jordan
Green
What's
Changed in New York
January
3, 2002
Walt Brasch
Exit
Cheney, Enter Ridge
Mokhiber
and Weissman
The
10 Worst Corporations
of 2001
Robert
Hunter Wade
America's
Empire Rules an Unbalanced World
Shahid
Alam
Is
There an Islamic Problem?
January
2, 2002
Ross Regnart
Patriot
Act Redefines the Mob as "Terrorist Associates"
John Chuckman
The
Republicans' Secret Plan X
David
Vest
Turn,
Turn, Turn
January
1, 2002
Kathy
Kelly
Iraq's
New Year
December
31, 2001
John Absood
An
Alternative to War in Iraq
Ramzi
Kysia
Iraq
Goes Radioactive
December
28, 2001
John Chuckman
Observing
George Bush
Suren
Pillay
Civilian
Bodies
Aaron
Lehmer
Inviting
Future Terrorism
December
27, 2001
Patrick
McNamara
Palestinian
Children Bear Brunt of Mideast Violence
Nelson
Valdés
A
Possible Scenario on the Location of bin Laden
Jensen
and Mahajan
Remember
the Afghan Dead
Philip
Farruggio
A
New Year's Resolution
Ramzi
Kysia
The
People of the Valley
December 26, 2001
John Chuckman
In
Praise of the Unspeakable
Sam Bahour
2002:
Year of the Twos
December 25, 2001
Jennifer Loewenstein
Israel's
Human Rights Record
December 24, 2001
Sam Bahour
It
Happened One Morning
Yair Khilou
Why I Resisted
Being Drafted into the Israeli Army
Michael
Chisari
War
as Diversionary Tactic
Cockburn/St. Clair
Enron
and the Green Seal
A Photographic Journal of Life
in an Afghan Refugee Camp
By Judith Mann
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Torture in US Prisons
bin Laden and Bush
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Pakistan
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Cockburn
and Jeffrey St. Clair
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Six Decades of Memphis Music Photographs
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Text by Daniel Wolff
The New Intifada:
Resisting Israel's Apartheid
Edited by Roane Carey
A Pocket Guide to
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January
5, 2002
The Battle for Kashmir
Do We Have to Wait
for a War to Bring These Politicians to Their Senses?
By Tariq Ali
Despite pleas of the new pro-Western regime, Afghanistan
is still being bombed. Innocent people die every day. Osama
bin Laden is still at large, but attention has already shifted
to Pakistan. The destabilising effects of the war in Afghanistan
were always likely to be felt here first. The reasons are obvious.
The Pashtun population in Pakistan's
North-Western Frontier Province shares linguistic and ethnic
ties with the region that formed the principal base of the Taliban
in Afghanistan. The same brand of Deobandi Islam is strong on
both sides of the border. It is worth stressing that there was
less actual fighting on the ground in the last three months
than there has been over the last quarter century. The bearded
ones chose not to fight. A sizeable section of the Taliban forces
simply came back home to Pakistan. Some of them are undoubtedly
demoralised and happy to be alive, but there is probably a large
minority that is angered by Islamabad's betrayal and is eager
to link up with the armed fundamentalist groups already in the
country.
The leaders of the most virulent jihadi
sects have been arrested, but who will disarm their militants?
Until late last year some of the Islamist leaders were boasting
that they had chosen 20 cities on which Islamic laws would be
imposed. The unstated threat was clear. If any authority attempted
to interfere, they would unleash a civil war. When the latest
Afghan war began, Washington made no secret of its fear that
a massive Western intervention in Afghanistan that overtly used
Pakistan as a launching-pad might trigger major unrest or even
a coup against a collaborationist regime. The US did everything
to maintain decorous appearances for General Musharraf, Pakistan's
ruler, while making sure of the practical compliance of Islamabad.
In return for this, sanctions were lifted and money and the
latest weaponry began to flow into Pakistan once again.
But now that the Taliban have been defeated,
can anyone be sure that the various fig-leaves will really insulate
Pakistan from the indignation of the faithful? Everything depends
on the unity of the officer corps. To some degree, if one difficult
to gauge, Sunni fundamentalism has also penetrated the ranks
of the armed forces. Across the country, radical Islamism of
one kind or another is a vocal, if minority, force. General
Musharraf's military regime itself is, moreover, a very recent
and none-too-strong creation, with little positive civilian
support.
The abandonment of its own creation in
Afghanistan will be a bitter pill for many in the army, especially
at junior levels of command, where religious influence is strongest.
However, even more secular-minded officers are not pleased at
the outcome. The Taliban takeover in Kabul was the Pakistan
army's only victory. Privately the ruling elite--officers, bureaucrats
and politicians--congratulated each other for having gained
a new province. It almost made up for the 1971 defection of
Bangladesh. As if to rub salt into the wounds, the Northern
Alliance and its Washington-selected Prime Minister, Hamid Karzai,
have just declared their intention of forging close relations
with India, as was the case from 1947-89. This has further weakened
the position of the general ruling Pakistan.
It is true that, at more senior levels,
the American crusade against the Taliban has been seen as a
godsend. For at a stroke it has allowed the Pakistani generals
to recover their traditional regional priority for Washington,
assured them of credits they desperately need and lifted opposition
to their nuclear arsenal. Unlike its Arab counterparts, the
Pakistani army has never seen a coup mounted by captains, majors
or colonels--when it has seized power, as so often, it has always
done so without splits, at the initiative and under the control
of its generals (a tradition of discipline inherited from the
Raj).
At all events, short of a break in this
long-established pattern, it seems unlikely that the top-brass
of the Pakistani regime will suffer much from the pieces of
silver with which they have been showered. However, the scale
of the Pakistani defeat is such that, once the flow of money
and weapons ceases, General Musharraf might well be toppled
from within. Power-hungry generals have never been a rare commodity
in Pakistan.
This is what makes the tension with India
potentially dangerous. The irony is that Pakistan is led by
a secular general and India by a fundamentalist Hindu politician:
an ideal combination to make peace. Yet on one level it would
suit both sides to have a small war. General Musharraf could
prove that he was not a total pawn. And Atal Bihari Vajpayee,
India's Prime Minster, could win an election. The Kashmiris
would continue to suffer. But who could guarantee a small war?
The fact is that Pakistan's infiltration
of jihadi groups, such as the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and the Jaish-e-Mohammed,
into Indian-occupied Kashmir has created an alternative military
apparatus that Islamabad funds and supplies but can't fully
control--just like the Taliban. It's obvious that the attack
on the Indian Parliament was carried out by one of these groups
to provoke a more serious conflict. Some of the jihadis don't
much care for Pakistan as an entity. Their aim is to restore
Muslim rule in India. Crazy? Yes, but armed and capable of wreaking
havoc in both countries. If General Musharraf won't deal with
the menace, Mr Vajpayee will.
If Washington can wage its "war
on terrorism", why can't Delhi? Just because it can't get
retrospective sanction from the UN? But as any Second World
politician will tell you, for UN read US. The threat of an Indo-Pak
war has concentrated minds in Washington: how to give the Indians
their pound of flesh without destabilising Pakistan? Perhaps
the time is coming when General Musharraf can be sacrificed
in the name of a return to democracy in Pakistan. The problem
is that no civilian politician in Pakistan is strong enough to
challenge the army, which has ruled the country longer than
any political party.
The real solution lies in Kashmir, the
cause of a dispute that could lead to nuclear conflict. Kashmiris
have suffered long enough. The brutality of the Indian occupation
made many of them turn to Pakistan, but the behaviour of the
jihadi infiltrators has shocked most Kashmiris. The very thought
of Talibanisation has led many educated professionals, male
and female, to flee. They would like to be rid of both sides.
An autonomous Kashmir, which shares sovereignty
with both India and Pakistan, and even China, could become a
haven of peace in the region. Sooner or later the situation
will require some such solution, but do we have to wait for
a war to bring politicians to their senses?
Tariq Ali
is a frequent contributor to CounterPunch. He is the author of
The
Stone Woman. Verso will publish the his new book, 'Clash
of Fundamentalisms: Crusades, Jihads and Modernity' in April.
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