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Today's
Stories
March 17, 2008
Pam Martens
The
Fed's Wall Street Dilemma
Sasan Fayazmanesh
The US, Iran and the Policy of Dual Containment
March 15 /
16, 2008
Patrick Cockburn
How
to Destroy a Country in Five Years
Mike Whitney
Bearly
Alive: Investment Giant Rushed to ICU by Panicky Fed Chief
Ralph Nader
Of
Laws and Men
Robert Pollin
It's Still the Economy, Stupid
Diane Christian
The Poetics of Perversity: From Boccaccio to Spitzer
Wajahat Ali
Faking the Hood: a Conversation with Ishmael Reed
Tom Wright
/
Therese Saliba
Rachel Corrie's Case for Justice
Alan Farago
Back to Florida: Where Bushtime Began
Greg Moses
Raiding the Family Room in Texas
Michael Hudson
A Grand Global Bargain?
Martha Rosenberg
Why Hillary's Favorite Chicken Company is Eying China
John Goekler
Fourth Generation Warfare in a Fifth Generation Conflict
Uzma Aslam
Khan
A Letter to Barack Obama: Where's the Change, Barack?
Oren Ben-Dor
The Silencing of Gilad Atzmon
David Underhill
Mammon, Morals and the Mobile Tanker Deal
Fred Gardner
The Education of Eliot Spitzer
David Michael
Green
Why Spitzer Should Have Resigned (and Why He Shouldn't Have)
Rev. William E. Alberts
Jesus, Entombed in Heaven
Gail Dines
It's All About the John: Prostitution and Male Power
David Yearsley
Conducting, Anarchy and the Problem of When to Begin
Chris Clarke
Walking with Zeke: the Luckiest of Dogs
Poets' Basement
Anderson, Lodge & Subiet
Website of
the Day
Deviant Art
March 14, 2008
Paul Craig
Roberts
Watching
the Dollar Die
Don Santina
Vichy
Democrats: Pelosi and the Politics of Collaboration
Patrick Cockburn
Iraqi
Mother Vows Revenge on US: How She Lost Her Husband and Her Sons
Tim Rinne
StratCom
Rules! The Next War Will Start in Nebraska
Robert Fantina
In
Torture We Trust
Saul Landau
Letter
to the Presidents-in-Waitings
David Macaray
Common
Myths About Labor Unions
Franklin Lamb
Is
the Bush Administration Switching Horses in Lebanon
Michael Neumann
The
One State Illusion: Reply to My Critics
March 13, 2008
Paul Craig
Roberts
Republicans
and "Free Market" Zealots Bring Disaster to America
Mike Whitney
Meltdown
Looms Larger As Credit Markets Freeze
Assaf Kfoury
"One-State
or Two State?"- Sterile Debate on False Alternatives
Andy Worthington
Afghan
Hero Who Died in Guantánamo: The Background to the Story
Adam Federman
From
Autopia to Autogeddon: Cars Reach the End of the Road
March 12, 2008
Dave Lindorff
Bringing
Down Spitzer: It's the Big Brother Who Should Bother US
R.F. Blader
The
Spitzer Backlash
Yonatan Mendel
How
to be an Israeli Journalist. Never Write "Murder" or
"Palestine"
Jonathan Cook
One
State or Two? Neither. The Issue is Zionism
Bill and Kathy
Christison
Fallon
and Gates -- At Least One Cheer
James J. Brittain
Was
the U.S. Involved in Killing the FARC-EP Leaders
Ron Jacobs
"All
the Money You Make Will Never Buy Back Your Soul"
March 11, 2008
Paul Craig
Roberts
How
to End the Subprime Crisis
Ed O'Loughlin
How
Israeli Troops Invade Homes in Gaza, Brutalize, Smash and Steal
Ramzy Baroud
'Unwavering
Commitment' to Inequality
Kathy Christison
One
State or Two? The Debate Over Israel and Palestine
China Hand
PRC
Plays it Cool, as U.S. Tries to Amp Up Pressure on Iran
John Joslin
Thank
You, Nafta! Welcome to Weirton, Home of the Discount Cigarette
Mike Averko
Serb
Politics, Kosovo and the Moscow-Washington Divide
Ben Rosenfeld
Gavin
Newsom's Kneejerk Plan
Thierry Paquot
High
Rise, Low Spirits:The Curse of the Tower Block
March 10, 2008
Uri Avnery
"Kill
A Hundred Turks and Rest": The Five-Day War in Gaza
Col. Dan Smith
Scoring
the "Surge" and What Lies Beyond
R.F. Blader
Why
"Lock Them Up and Throw Away the Key" is Losing its
Sheen
Michael Neumann
The
One-State Illusion: More is Less
Bob Fitrakis
and Harvey Wasserman
Did
the Republicans Give Hillary Her Victory in Ohio?
James J. Brittain
Anti-Uribe
Protests in Colombia and the World
Missy Comley
Beattie
The
Passion of John McCain
March 8-9,
2008 Weekend Edition
JoAnn Wypijewski
The
Only Way to Fight the Clintons
Mike Whitney
Sorting
Through the Rubble in Post Bubble America
Peter Morici
Fed
and Treasury Fiddle as Economy Plummets
Ralph Nader
The
Silent Violence of Gaza's Suffering that Candidates Ignore
Jonathan Cook
The
Meaning of Gaza's Shoah
Steve Niva
Behind
the Israeli Escalation in Gaza
Bill and Kathy
Christison
Crisis
over Teheran's Alleged Nuclear Plans Nearing Climax
Hervé
Do Alto and Franck Poupeau
Bolivia:
Morales is Checked
Eric Walberg
To
Leave and Stay at the Same Time: Putin to Medvedev to…?
Scott Johnson
City
of A Thousand Foreclosures
Mark Scaramella
James
Brown's Gate
Bill Clinton
President
Clinton's Remarks on Naming William M. Daley as NAFTA Task Force
Chairman
Poet's Basement
St.
Thomasino, Engel, Davies and Willson
Website of
the Weekend
Hillary
Blackens Barack
March 7, 2008
Patrick Cockburn
Why
Iraq Could Blow-Up in John McCain's Face
Robin Blackburn
Question
for Barrack Obama: Why Afghanistan is the 'Right War'?
Saul Landau
The
Stupid Economy
Binoy Kampmark
When
Competition is Good: McCain and the Muddled Democrats
Chris Floyd
Crushing
the Ants: Admiral Fallon and His Empire
Andy Worthington
Spanish
Drop "Inhuman" Extradition Request for Guantánamo
Britons
Will Potter
Before
the Smoke Even Clears in Seattle: Bringing Out the T Word
March 6, 2008
March 6, 2008
Vincent Navarro
The
Next Failure of Health Reform
Forrest Hylton
High Stakes in the Andes: Colombia's Cornered President
Peter Morici
Why the Dollar is So Cheap
George Ciccariello-Maher
Counter-Attack of the Bureaucrats
John Ross
Taxi! Taxi! The Dark Side of the Oscars
Jacob Hornberger
No Standing to Lecture on Justice
Paul Watson
Illegal Japanese Whaling by the Numbers
Dan Bacher
Off the Deep End
Website of the Day
A Katrina Reader Online
March 5, 2008
Cockburn /
St. Clair
A
Great Day for John McCain (and Maybe Nader)
Joanne Mariner
After Guantanamo
Fidel Castro
The Raid on Ecuador: Underestimating Rafael Correa
Christopher
Brauchli
The Turkish Invasions
Steven Sherman
Obama and the Prospects for a Renewal of the Left
Dave Lindorff
Busting Bush & Co. in New England
James Murren
Bombing Somalia
Adam Engel
Necropolis Now
Website of Day
Remember Song
March 4, 2008
Wajahat Ali
Mumbo
Jumbo: Naming Names with Ishmael Reed
William Blum
How Could Hillary Have Known?
Bill Quigley
The Cleansing of New Orleans
Ralph Nader
The Prince Harry Solution
Patrick Irelan
Oil and Health in Venezuela
James J. Brittain
/
R. James Sacouman
Uribe's Colombia is Destabilizing a New Latin America
Norman Solomon
The War Election
Jacob Hornberger
Hillary in Waco: the Missing Apology
Andy Worthington
Guantánamo and the European Parliament
Mike Averko
Kosovo and the Press
Website of the Day
Tex-Mex Primary
March 3, 2008
Jennifer Loewenstein
Gazan Holocaust
Alan Farago
American Politics and the Faltering Economy
Richard Gott
Colombian Deaths in Ecuador
Wajahat Ali
Who Speaks for a Billion Muslims? Analyzing the World Gallup
Poll with John Esposito
Paul Craig Roberts
The Mukasey Conspiracy: a Bi-Partisan Attack on the Constitution
Robert Weissman
When Multinationals Say Adieu
Uri Avnery
Good Morning, Hamas
Martha Rosenberg
When Your Meat is a Downer
Eva Liddell
Leave the Next Dance for Bill
Michael Donnelly
Will Ferrell Does Flint
Website of the Day
Muddy Waters: Train Fare Home Blues
March 1 / 2,
2008
Alexander Cockburn
The
Race Card
Paul Craig
Roberts
The
Political Trial of Don Siegelman
Kathleen and Bill Christison
Nader the Best Antidote to American Imperialism
Nelson P. Valdés
Cuba After Fidel
Christopher Brauchli
Meet Mr. Nursultan Nazarbayev: Friend of Bill, George and Dick
Ron Jacobs
Inside the Secret City: Bomb Making at Oak Ridge
John Ross
The New Conquistadores: Spain's Reconquest of Mexico
Robert Fantina
Posturing Over Patriotism: Obama and Those Lapel Pins
Robert Weissman
Hidden in Plain Sight: Human Rights Hypocrisy
Mohammed Omer
Fear in Gaza
Remi Kanazi
Barack Obama and the Politics of Xenophobia
Bob Jackson
Why is Yellowstone Destroying Its Bison Herd?
Richard Rhames
Casual Threats: Loaded with Mercury
Franklin Lamb
Lebanon Awaits the Arrival of the USS Cole
Rannie Amiri
Showboat Diplomacy: US Warships Steam Toward Lebanon
David Michael
Green
The Three Faces of Hillary: the Politics of Flim-Flam
Conn Hallinan
Notes from the Southern Cone
Faheem Hussain
Prince Harry of Afghanistan and the Meaning of Normalcy
Poets' Basement
Gibbons, Orloski, Gardner and Ford
Website of
the Weekend
The Palestine Chronicle Needs (and Deserves) Your Help!
February 29,
2008
Matt Gonzalez
The
Obama Craze
Jonathan Cook
Academic Freedom? Not for Arabs in Israel
Joshua Frank
Obama and Israel
Anthony DiMaggio
The Unilateral Presidency: Signing Statements and the Rollback
of American Law
Linn Washington, Jr.
Cop Abuse in America
Binoy Kampmark
Hubris and Nemesis
Robert Bryce
Energy Efficiency May be a Good Thing, But It Won't Cut Energy
Use
Sonja Karkar
Australia's Government Continues Its Love Affair with Israel
Dave Lindorff
A Manchurian Candidate in the White House? Obama or Bush?
Website of
the Day
Olduvai George
February 28,
2008
Patrick Cockburn
"Iraq"
Falls Apart
Fred Gardner
The Birth of NAFTA
Michael Levitin
The Crisis in Kosovo is Just Beginning
William S.
Lind
The Fake State of Kosovo
David Macaray
A Ray of Hope for Organized Labor
Stephen Fleischman
Nader's Latest Run: Monkey Wrench or Cattle Prod?
George Wuerthner
The Myths of Forest Health: Why Ecological Logging is an Oxymoron
Laura Carlsen
The North American Union Farce
Carl Finamore
Why the Delta-Northwest Deal Hasn't Taken Off
Michael Dickinson
The Day I Bombed the House of Commons
Website of the Day
Plane Stupid
February 27,
2008
David Rosen
Playing
the Race Card: Obama, Love Across the Color Line and Political
Dirty Tricks
Vijay Prashad
Bomber John: McCain and the 100 Year War
Harvey Wasserman
Incident at Turkey Point: Did Florida Go to the Radioactive Brink?
Andy Worthington
Guantánamo's Shambolic Trials: Pentagon Boss Resigns,
Ex-Prosecutor Joins Defense
Wajahat Ali
Pakistan for Sale: an Interview with Ayesha Siddiqa on Pakistan's
Military Economy
Peter Morici
The Auction-Rate Securities Fiasco: a Drama of Greed and Betrayal
Stephen Philion
Conspiracy Theory, Fears of Betrayal and Today's Anti-War Movement
Michael Donnelly
Obama by Unanimous Decision
Erica Rosenberg /
Janine Blaeloch
After the Land Deals: Will There
be Any Wilderness Left to Protect?
Website of
the Day
Dress Blues
February 26,
2008
Debbie Nathan
Confessions
of a Gitmo Guard
Alan Dershowitz
v. Frank Menetrez
On Finkelstein
Harvey Wasserman
How Ohio Got Nuked
Michael Colby
Ralph Nader vs. the Fundamentalist Liberals
Gary Leupp
Condi vs. Putin on Bullying Belgrade
David Orchard
The New Conquistadors: Canada in Afghanistan
Martha Rosenberg
The Big HRT
Fran Shor
The Electoral Circus and Nader's Sideshow
Serge Halimi
The Dom Perignon Socialist Manifesto: Bernard Henri-Levy's Plan
for the French Left
Global Balkans
Neo-Liberalism and Protectorate States in the Post-Yugoslav Balkans:
an Interview with Tariq Ali
Website of
the Day
Texistentialism
February 25,
2008
Roger Morris
A
Death in Damascus
Anthony DiMaggio
Military
Bases, the Media and the Democrats
Ralph Nader
Why I'm Running
Patrick Cockburn
Iraq Broils
Paul Craig Roberts
Kosovo and the Empire Crazies
Peter Morici
Bernanke's Failing Policies: a Long Recession Looms
Dave Lindorff
General Welch's Whitewash: What We Still Don't Know About That
Minot Nuke Incident
Saul Landau
/
Farrah Hassen
Fanatics, Mountebanks and Drillers: a Bloody Oil Film
Heather Gray
James Orange, Civil Rights Legend
Robert Weitzel
Accomodating Torture
John Halle
Kucinich Goes Down
Website of the Day
Do the Trunk Monkey!
February 23 / 4, 2008
Alexander Cockburn
The
Mushrooming Clouds That Hang Over McCain
Paul Craig
Roberts
Obama
and Global Trade
Wajahat Ali
Omissions of the Commission: an Interview with Phillip Shenon
on the 9/11 Commission
Ralph Nader
Neutering the FDA
Jürgen
Vsych
"What Was Ralph Nader Thinking?"
Fidel Castro
Watching the US Presidential Campaign from Havana
Andy Worthington
Britain's Guantánamo
David Macaray
Unions Under Assault
Jeremy Scahill
The Real Story Behind Kosovo's Independence
David Krieger
Stanley Sheinbaum
Caging the Cold War Monster
Ron Jacobs
Building for the Future
Michael Garrity
The Last, Best Hope for the Northern Rockies
Brian McKenna
Higher Ed's "Civic Engagements" Get Dumbed Down
Missy Beattie
Over the Hill with John McCain
Fred Gardner
American College of Physicians Takes Pro-Cannabis Stand (Mostly)
Boris Kagarlitsky
The Growth of the Russian Labor Movement
Mike Ferner
Kick That Barrel
Dan Bacher
On the Trail with the Border Angels
Christopher
Ketcham
Hillary Goes Where Obama Fears to Tread
Poets' Basement
Davies and Buknatski
Website of
the Weekend
Obama
Mariachi
February 22,
2008
Mike Whitney
The
Bonfire of Capital
Jason Hribal
Elephants and the Circus: The Story of Janet
Liaquat Ali Khan
Arresting Musharraf
Joshua Frank
That Obama Glow: the Nuclear Industry's Golden Child
Dave Lindorff
Vicki's John: Ask Not What She Did for Him, Ask What He Did for
Her!
Liliana Segura
When Torture is Old News: McCain's Blonde Diversion
Robert Fantina
Castro, Bush and Cuba: a Fiasco Waiting to Happen?
Yifat Susskind
The ABCs of Death: Bush vs. Africa's Women
Norm Kent
Pushing 60 with Pot
Website of
the Day
Bush Gets Down in Liberia
February 21,
2008
Saul Landau
Fidel
Steps Aside
Elizabeth Schulte
Left Behind, With No End in Sight: America's Long-Term Unemployed
Helen Redmond
Health Care as a Human Right
Benjamin Dangl
Undermining Bolivia
Michael Levitin
Kosovo's Dilemma
Liam Leonard
Fear and Loathing on the Emerald Isle
Patrick Irelan
Land and Food in Venezuela
Linn Cohen-Cole
Poor Ohio: a Second Letter to Hillary on Her Ties to Monsanto
Michael Simmons
Daydream Believer: John Stewart, the Miles Davis of Folk Music
CounterPunch
News Service
A Message from the Women of Okinawa to US GIs
Website of the Day
Cop Abuse in Shreveport
|
St.
Patrick's Day Edition
March 17, 2008
Sanctions, War
and the Policy of Dual Containment
The
United States and Iran
By SASAN FAYAZMANESH
It is now nearly three decades since
the Unites States adopted the policy of dual containment of Iran
and Iraq. While much has been written about the containment of
Iraq, there has been very little in-depth analysis of this policy
when it comes to Iran. In a book that is going to be released
on March 31, 2008, entitled The
United States and Iran: Sanctions, Wars and the Policy of Dual
Containment (Routledge), I attempt to address this shortcoming
by investigating when and why the US policy of containment of
Iran came about, how it evolved, and where it stands today.[1]
To the extent that Israel has been involved in US policy making,
the study will also include the role that Israel has played in
the containment of Iran. Also, since the fate of Iran has been
inextricably linked to that of Iraq, occasionally the investigation
will overlap with the containment of Iraq.
The policy of dual containment
of Iran and Iraq originated during the Carter Administration,
but it was not until the Clinton Administration that the expression
"dual containment" became popular. Despite its widespread
use, the meaning of the expression is not crystal clear; different
individuals have had different interpretations of "containment"
of Iran and Iraq. For some, it has meant keeping the two countries
militarily, economically, and politically in check. This was
the case with Iraq between 1990-when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait
and United Nations sanctions were imposed on Iraq-and 2003-when
the US invaded Iraq for the second time and occupied the country.
In the case of Iraq, it was hoped initially that economic pressures
through extensive United Nations sanctions, as well as some limited
military actions, would create discontent and lead to "regime
change." But since sanctions did not result in the overthrow
of Hussein, Iraq was not exactly contained. The 2003 US invasion
and occupation of Iraq showed that containment could go beyond
sanctions and limited military operations; it could involve outright
invasion of a country to achieve the desired goals.
To this day, the US military
adventure in Iraq has not been successful, and the future of
Iraq and its government remains uncertain. In this sense, some
may argue that Iraq has not been contained. But a few might disagree
with this conclusion. For these individuals Iraq has already
been contained, since the country has been economically ruined,
militarily shattered, and politically disintegrated. For decades
to come, Iraq will not be able to rise from the ashes and challenge
the US and Israel; and this, in the opinion of these individuals,
is a successful containment. Such a view might appear to be too
cynical to be held by anyone. But, as I have argued in my book,
the attitude of many US and Israeli officials toward the Iran-Iraq
war indicates that this view did actually exist. Some American
and Israeli officials wished to see Iran and Iraq destroy one
another in a costly and protracted war. They helped to prolong
the war and make sure that neither side had a decisive victory.
The horrendous eight-year war, which resulted in a massive loss
of human life and severe economic losses, was therefore viewed
as a kind of containment. The same view of containment seems
to exist today among many so-called neoconservatives who, after
pushing for the Iraq invasion, show no remorse for the resulting
carnage and advocate bombing Iran.
Whatever the interpretation
of the dual containment of Iran and Iraq, one aspect of this
policy has been to use war, or threats of war, to bring about
the desired change. Another has been to rely on sanctions. US
unilateral sanctions against Iran started shortly after the 1979
Revolution and continued throughout the Iran-Iraq war. In this
period many of the imposed sanctions were intended to prevent
Iran from winning the war against Hussein's Iraq. But it was
also hoped that sanctions would bring about popular dissatisfaction
in Iran and result in the overthrow of the new government. Such
sanctions continued and became even more intensified after the
Iran-Iraq war, particularly in the 1990s. Yet, even though these
sanctions did harm the Iranian economy, they did not bring about
the intended "regime change." The failure was attributed
to the unilateral nature of these sanctions, and therefore multilateral
sanctions, imposed through the United Nations, were sought. So
far three such sanctions have been passed against Iran. Whether
these sanctions will have the desired results and, eventually,
would do to Iran what has been done to Iraq is hard to predict.
But it is even harder to make any predictions about the future
without knowing the past. It was in the spirit of documenting
the history, in order to better understand the present and the
future, that The United States and Iran Sanctions, Wars and
the Policy of Dual Containment was written. An outline of
the book is as follows.
The origin of the dual containment
policy, as mentioned above, goes back to the Carter Administration.
There is plenty of evidence to suggest that individuals within
the Carter Administration, contrary to their denials, gave Hussein
the green light to invade Iran and assisted him after the invasion.
It was hoped that the war would not only lead to the resolution
of the so-called hostage crisis, but that it might lead to the
overthrow of the Iranian government and the restoration of the
old order, where the Shah of Iran maintained a symbiotic relationship
with the US and Israel. However, assisting Hussein in his war
against Iran did not mean that the US was planning to establish
a long-term relationship with him. Befriending Hussein was temporary;
and while the US was helping the Iraqi government, the Israelis
were selling arms to Iran with the full knowledge of the US.
Indeed, the Carter Administration itself was considering the
possibility of providing Iran with military spare parts as well.
This was the beginning of the policy of dual containment, when
the US, playing the role of a double agent, tried to make sure
that neither side would achieve a decisive victory in the Iran-Iraq
war.
The dual containment policy
continued in the 1980s under the Reagan and George H. W. Bush
Administrations. But while the US assisted Hussein covertly
during the Carter period, it did so overtly during the Reagan
Administration, despite the official US policy of remaining neutral
in the war. The support also became more vigorous. US officials
tried to prevent Iran from winning the war against Hussein by
providing him with intelligence, weapons, and extension of credit.
They also established full diplomatic relations with Hussein's
government, lifted trade sanctions against Iraq, and imposed
new economic sanctions against Iran. In addition, the Reagan
Administration closed its eyes to the use of chemical weapons
by Iraq in the war, and, indeed, supplied Saddam Hussein with
chemical compounds that had multiple uses, including making poison
gas. Subsequently, with the Iranian military victories, the US
entered the war against Iran directly to assure that Hussein
was not defeated. With this direct US intervention, in 1988 Iran
was forced to accept a humiliating ceasefire, especially after
the USS Vincennes affair. In the end, the Reagan Administration
had managed by means of indirect and direct war to defeat Iran
for all practical purposes and contain it. Yet the policy of
dual containment demanded that not only Iran but also Iraq be
emasculated as a potential challenger. Therefore, while helping
Hussein, the US also sold arms to Iran, mostly with the help
of the Israelis, in what came to be known as the "Iran-Contra
scandal." Furthermore, the US administration provided both
Iran and Iraq with deliberately distorted or inaccurate intelligence
data on the other's capabilities. More importantly, with the
end of the Iran-Iraq war-and the emergence of Iraq militarily
stronger at the end of the war than at the beginning-the US turned
its attention toward containing Iraq. This was accomplished through
manufactured sensational news and incidents, as well as a sudden
US interest in the "gross violation of international law"
by Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war. The final incident was Iraq's
invasion of Kuwait after the US gave confusing messages to Hussein.
Following this invasion, the US tried to contain Iraq by means
of a war, UN economic sanctions, and limited military operations.
The US policy of the dual containment
cannot be understood without understanding the role that Israel
has played in it. Following the 1979 Revolution in Iran, which
ended a cozy and symbiotic relation between the Jewish state
and the Shah, Israel started a campaign against the new Iranian
government. However, once the Iran-Iraq war started, Israel began
to sell arms to Iran. This was not because Israel was against
the US policy of dual containment and the devastation of Iran
and Iraq in a costly and protracted war, but because Israel wished
to see Iraq contained before Iran. As a result, while the US
was aiding Iraq, Israel was selling arms to Iran, and, eventually,
got the US to sell arms to Iran in the infamous Iran-Contra scandal.
When put in historical context the Iran-Contra affair does not
appear as an aberration or isolated incident. It was part of
the policy of helping to contain both countries. At the end of
the Iran-Iraq war, however, Israel, like the US, largely concentrated
on containing Iraq. In so doing, Israel contributed greatly to
the propaganda campaign against Saddam Hussein before Iraq was
invaded by the US. After the imposition of UN sanctions against
Iraq in 1990 and the first US invasion of Iraq, Israel turned
its attention toward containing Iran. With the help of its lobby
groups in the US, particularly the American Israel Public Affairs
Committee (AIPAC), Israel concentrated on strengthening US economic
sanctions against Iran. In this pursuit, Martin Indyk, the head
of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, an AIPAC affiliate,
became instrumental. The meteoric rise of Martin Indyk to power
in the Clinton Administration allowed him to carry on the policy
of dual containment-which he took credit for devising-primarily
by means of increasing sanctions against Iran. In this policy
Iran was accused of three misbehaviors: sponsoring terrorism
worldwide; opposing Middle East peace efforts; and developing
weapons of
mass destruction. Once formulated,
these alleged misbehaviors became the rationale for maintaining
and strengthening US sanctions against Iran. Indeed, during the
Clinton Administration Israeli lobby groups became the major
underwriters of US foreign policy toward Iran.
Besides Martin Indyk there
were other individuals in the Clinton Administration who helped
develop the Iran sanctions policy. One such individual was Secretary
of State Warren Christopher, who had a particular animosity toward
Iran since his hostage negotiation days. This animosity came
in handy for Indyk and the Israeli lobby groups in implementing
their sanctions policy against Iran. But this was not all; there
was also a competition between a predominantly Republican Congress
and a Democratic Administration as to which was more hostile
to Iran and thus faithful to Israel. In this competition, the
role of Senator Alfonse D'Amato in trying to pass sanctions acts
against Iran is examined in my book. One major act, the Iran-Libya
Sanctions Act (ILSA)-which imposed secondary sanctions on foreign
companies that would make new investments of at least $40 million
in Iran-becomes a focus of my study. With the passage of ILSA,
however, the US sanctions policy started to fall apart. Not only
did many countries around the world defy it, the US corporate
lobbies, too, began to organize to oppose various Israeli lobby
groups. In this regard, I examine the role of some heavyweights
that the corporate lobby brought forth to oppose the sanctions-such
as two former national security advisors, Zbigniew Brzezinski
and Brent Scowcroft-the formation of an umbrella lobby organization
called USA*ENGAGE, various individuals or lobbyist groups working
with the Iranian government who started to organize, and a number
of US Congressmen who were lobbied by the corporations to oppose
the passage of further unilateral sanctions against Iran. All
this, as well as the appointment of a new Secretary of State,
Madeleine Albright, who tilted more toward the corporate lobby,
resulted in an incoherent and inconsistent US policy toward Iran
at the end of the Clinton era, a policy that tried to reconcile
the irreconcilable aims and interests of Israel and the US corporations.
It is worth noting that during the Clinton Administration the
Mujahedin-e-Khalq-e-Iran (MEK), an Iranian exile group, became
a convenient tool in the hands of strange bedfellows-namely Iraq,
the US, and Israel-in a campaign to overthrow the Iranian government.
Even though in 1997, as a result of some shifts in US foreign
policy, the US State Department put MEK officially on the list
of terrorist organizations, the group operates relatively freely
in the US to this day.
The end of the Clinton era
ushered in a new phase in the US policy of containment of Iran.
The 2000 US presidential election brought uncertainty concerning
the future policies of the Bush Administration toward the Middle
East in general and Iran in particular. The fact that the new
administration was top heavy with former oil executives added
to this uncertainty. Yet, in spite of the uncertainty, Israel
correctly perceived that the policy would be made more by the
neoconservative forces within the new administration-such as
Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Perle-than anyone else, including
those in the State Department. Wolfowitz and Perle-who were on
the Board of Advisors of the Washington Institute for Near East
Policy, an offshoot of AIPAC-had advocated, at least since 1992,
the use of military force against Iraq. But Israel was more interested
in containing Iran rather than Iraq and was hoping that the neoconservative
forces, particularly those within the administration, would achieve
that goal. The events of September 11, 2001 played a determining
role in both containments. The neoconservative forces got what
they had wished for when it came to invading Iraq. But as far
as Iran was concerned, the initial reaction of the US State Department
after 9/11 was to start a courtship dance with Iran, a dance
that Israel, its lobby groups, and its neoconservative allies,
in and out of the administration, watched with a great deal of
trepidation. A concerted campaign was waged by Israeli officials,
including Binyamin Netanyahu and Ariel Sharon, to end the dance.
The US was warned by these officials not to cozy up to Iran.
Such warnings, as well as the puzzling Karine-A affair,
managed to end the US State Department's attempt to approach
Iran. The death of the rapprochement was made official by President
Bush in his "axis of evil" speech on January 29, 2002,
a speech in which Iran was accused, along with Iraq and North
Korea, of aggressively pursuing weapons of mass destruction and
exporting terror. In the end, Israel, its various lobby groups,
and its neoconservative allies changed the direction of US policy
toward Iran as conceived by the US State Department. A case had
to be made as to why Iran should be targeted. Israel put forward
a list of allegations against Iran that included everything from
Iran's involvement in the Karine-A affair to pursuing
missiles capable of striking Israel with chemical and biological
weapons, dispatching its Revolutionary Guards to foment anti-Israel
activity in Lebanon, and being on schedule to develop a nuclear
bomb by 2005. Yet even though Israel had made its case for targeting
Iran, and wished to see Iran attacked before Iraq, it had to
settle for second-best: wait until after the invasion of Iraq
to contain Iran. Thus, in an interview with The Times (London)
on November 5, 2002, Sharon stated that he considered Iran to
be the "centre of world terror," and "that as
soon as an Iraq conflict is concluded, he will push for Iran
to be at the top of the 'to do' list."
How was Iran pushed to the
top of the US's "to do" list? As in the case of Iraq,
Iran's alleged development of weapons of mass destruction became
the rallying point for targeting the country. The first step
in the process came in late summer 2002, when, in a dramatic
press conference, a representative of MEK revealed the construction
of a uranium enrichment facility and a heavy water production
plant in Iran, neither of which had been reported to the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The actual source of the revelation
appears to have been Israel, which passed the information to
MEK. Once these constructions were disclosed, the US and Israel
started to build a case for reporting Iran to the United Nations
Security Council and for the imposition of sanctions. How the
case proceeded is narrated in my book. Before that, however,
the origin of Iran's nuclear program is discussed. It is argued
that the US and Israel had no problems with Iran's nuclear program
when the Shah of Iran was in power. Indeed, the US helped the
Shah with nuclear technology and encouraged him to build nuclear
power plants. Subsequently, the Shah signed an agreement to purchase
two reactors from Germany to be installed at Bushehr. The construction
of these power plants began in 1975, but after the 1979 Iranian
Revolution the Germans left the country without completing the
project. In 1995 Iran signed a formal agreement with Russia to
finish the Bushehr reactor. But Russia continuously postponed
the completion of the reactor and delivery of nuclear fuel. Given
Russia's foot-dragging, as well as the numerous US sanctions
imposed on Iran, it appears that Iran had engaged in a number
of nuclear-related activities not reported to the IAEA, including
building the two structures that were disclosed by MEK. Even
though, technically speaking, the construction of these facilities
did not violate the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)-to
which Iran is a signatory-it provided the perfect excuse to the
US and Israel to argue that Iran was clandestinely developing
nuclear weapons. Such claims, however, were not new. They were
heard as early as 1984, when a neoconservative argued that Iran
might be only two years away from acquiring nuclear weapons.
Following this claim there were numerous others concerning the
impending development of nuclear weapons by Iran. Indeed, in
the 1990s a number of sources associated with Israel claimed
that Iran had already purchased three or four nuclear warheads
from the former Soviet republic of Kazakhstan. That allegation
and subsequent assertions concerning Iran developing nuclear
arsenals all proved to be false. But the guessing game continued
well into the late 1990s and early 2000s. With each day passing
and no nuclear weapons or even evidence of development of such
weapons showing up, the ever-changing prediction of doomsday
appeared to attract little attention until the revelation of
the two unreported nuclear-related facilities in Iran. Once this
revelation was made, Israel could push for Iran to be at the
top of the US's "to do" list.
The road was being paved to
report Iran to the Security Council. The 2003 IAEA report mentioned
certain failures by Iran to disclose information. It also encouraged
Iran to sign the "Additional Protocol" to the IAEA
Safeguards Agreements. But the report did not show any smoking
gun and, therefore, was not the report that the US and Israel
needed to contain Iran. Nevertheless, the report left a number
of open questions that made the US and Israel hopeful about taking
Iran before the Security Council. For example, why was Iran developing
a facility to produce heavy water, building a uranium enrichment
facility, manufacturing uranium metal, hesitant to allow IAEA
inspectors visit an electric workshop and take environmental
samples? The last question, in particular, made the US and Israel
contend that Iran was hiding something, and this could be an
indication of a nuclear weapons program. In the end, this allegation
proved to be incorrect. However, such allegations continued to
be made until Iran was reported to the Security Council. In addition
to making false claims, the US and Israel intensified their psychological
warfare against Iran, threatening a preemptive military strike
on her nuclear facilities. Such threats made the Europeans, particularly
France, Britain, and Germany (EU 3), worry and start negotiating
with Iran in October of 2003 to sign the "Additional Protocol,"
stop nuclear enrichment, and provide full disclosure of its nuclear
program. The Iranian government capitulated and signed an agreement
in December 2003, even though the Iranian parliament refused
to ratify the "Additional Protocol." The US and Israel,
however, continued their pressure on Iran by making false claims
and portraying Iran as a threat to Israel and the world at large.
Pressure mounted in summer of 2004 to report Iran to the Security
Council. The EU 3 made a last-ditch effort to stop Iran's enrichment
activities. The result was the November 2004 Paris Agreement,
which asked Iran to suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing
activities voluntarily and temporarily in exchange for some vague
and, for all practical purposes, undeliverable economic promises.
The US gave this agreement guarded approval but made it clear
that it was a kind of "good-cop, bad-cop arrangement,"
where the Europeans and Americans were working together but playing
different roles.
The US and Israel intensified
their threats of a preemptive strike against Iran in 2005. By
now the argument had changed from not allowing Iran to develop
nuclear weapons to not even tolerating Iran having knowledge
of nuclear enrichment. At the same time there were reports that
the US might support EU negotiations with Iran and accept the
so-called carrot and stick approach. Even though this was no
more than the bad cop joining the good cop, Israel and its lobby
groups were opposed to any shift in US policy and waged a campaign
against it. In Iran, too, there was opposition to the Paris Agreement,
especially after the US gave the agreement its tacit blessing.
The opposition became stronger with the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
as President of Iran, a man who was demonized by a massive US
and Israeli disinformation campaign as soon as he took office.
After protesting that the Paris Agreement was turning a voluntary
and temporary halt in uranium enrichment activities into a permanent
freeze and that the EU had not kept its part of the bargain,
Iran ended the agreement. The campaign to report Iran to the
Security Council by the IAEA gained momentum and a resolution
to this effect was passed; however, the question of the timing
of when the matter would be referred to the Security Council
was left open. A number of events speeded up the process of referral.
One such event was Ahmadinejad quoting Ayatollah Khomeini as
saying that the occupying regime of Jerusalem must disappear
from the page of time. The statement was translated in both Israel
and the US as "wipe Israel off the map," and was used
in a massive campaign to portray Iran as Nazi Germany and Ahmadinejad
as another Hitler poised to commit a holocaust. Another was the
claim by American intelligence officials that they had discovered
a stolen laptop showing Iran's attempt to design a nuclear warhead.
The contents of the laptop were shown to IAEA inspectors, but,
IAEA officials doubted the authenticity of the material, and
believed that much of the intelligence provided by the US and
other intelligence services had proved to be wrong. Numerous
assertions, even though false, made any compromise solution impossible.
In the end, a relentless effort by the US and Israel to bring
Iran before the Security Council and impose UN sanctions against
her paid off in early 2006. The IAEA was forced to issue an early
update brief followed by a full report on Iran's compliance with
the earlier resolution. But even before the full report was issued,
the five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany
reached an agreement, and soon afterwards the US obtained the
necessary vote to refer Iran to the Security Council. Iran, in
turn, ended all voluntary cooperation with the IAEA.
Accusations and threats by
US and Israel continued against Iran even after Iran's referral
to the Security Council. As the US allocated more funds to bringing
"democracy" to Iran, AIPAC mounted another "largest
ever policy conference" aimed at bringing about the harshest
possible sanctions against Iran. Frantic efforts by those uneasy
about imposing UN sanctions, including the Director General of
the IAEA, failed as most US policy makers followed the lead of
Israel and its allies in the US. The Security Council issued
in late March 2006 a draft statement asking Iran to halt all
enrichment activities, and ordered the Director General of the
IAEA to report in 30 days on Iran's compliance. This was not
exactly the harsh resolution that the US and Israel were hoping
for. The US pushed for the passage of a UN Chapter 7 resolution
against Iran that could result in the use of military force against
her. In this effort, parallels were continuously drawn between
Iran and Nazi Germany and Ahmadinejad and Hitler. Iran's alleged
hidden nuclear programs were reported and talks of pre-emptive
military attacks by either the US, Israel, or both were heard.
In this atmosphere even the most outrageous tales would become
credible news. One such story was an alleged new law in Iran
that would force the Iranian Jewish population to wear yellow
insignia. Even though the "news" proved to be a complete
fabrication, it for some time and enabled many political figures
around the world, particularly Americans, to condemn and demonize
Iran. The US, however, still had to get the reluctant Russians
and Chinese on board to impose sanctions against Iran. A new
strategy was adopted: the US would join the EU 3 in negotiating
with Iran if Iran halted all enrichment activities. The Bush
Administration knew full well that this offer would not be accepted
by Iran and was, indeed, worried about a possible positive response
by Iran. The US gambit paid off, and the "carrot and stick"
package offered was ultimately rejected by Iran. The US wielded
more sticks, including financial sanctions to paralyze the Iranian
banking system. Security Council Resolution 1696 was passed in
July 2006, demanding that Iran suspend all enrichment-related
and reprocessing activities and that the Director General of
the IAEA give a report by the end of August 2006 on Iran's compliance.
If Iran did not comply, according to Resolution 1696, UN sanctions
would be imposed. The stage was set for the imposition of the
first set of UN sanctions against Iran.
The August 2006 IAEA report
indicated that Iran was not complying with UN Resolution 1696.
The report was followed by Iran's adversaries calling for immediate
imposition of sanctions. Any compromise offered, including a
temporary suspension of uranium enrichment by Iran, was ruled
out by the US and Israel. The US further tightened its financial
sanctions against Iran, and Israel raised, once again, the specter
of Iran becoming another Nazi Germany determined to commit another
holocaust. The campaign to impose UN sanctions against Iran was
beginning to bear fruit. Draft resolutions for such sanctions
began to circulate in November 2006. War drums beat intensely
and there was again talk of a possible military strike by Israel
against Iran's nuclear facilities. US pressure mounted for adopting
a sanction resolution. The push resulted in Security Council
Resolution 1737 in December of 2006, the first UN sanction resolution
against Iran. The resolution demanded that Iran halt all enrichment-related
and reprocessing activities and suspend work on all heavy water-related
projects. It asked all states to take the necessary measures
to prevent the supply, sale, or transfer of all items, materials,
equipment, goods, and technology which could contribute to Iran's
enrichment related, reprocessing, or heavy water-related activities,
or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems. It
also asked all states to exercise vigilance regarding the entry
into or transit through their territories of individuals engaged
in Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development
of nuclear weapon delivery systems. In addition, the resolution
provided a list of certain Iranians and asked all states to freeze
their funds, other financial assets, and economic resources.
Moreover, the resolution established
a sanctions committee to monitor Iran's compliance with the resolution
and collect information from countries about their trade with
Iran. Finally, the resolution asked the Director General of the
IAEA to provide a report in 60 days on Iran's compliance. Resolution
1737 was the crown jewel of the US-Israeli policy of containment
of Iran. More than a quarter of a century of US unilateral sanctions
against Iran, many underwritten by forces close to Israel, had
not contained Iran. Even though this resolution was too weak
to contain Iran, it was hoped that future resolutions would do
the job. Iran shrugged off the sanctions and reduced its cooperation
with the IAEA. The US levied more accusations against Iran and
engaged in more provocative acts. Israel continued to call Iran
an existential threat. In early 2007 there were fears that a
war with Iran might become inevitable. In the end, however, the
threats of war were used to set the stage for the second round
of UN sanctions against Iran.
After an IAEA report indicating
Iran's non-compliance with Resolution 1737, the US and Israel
pushed for another resolution. The result was Security Council
Resolution 1747 in March 2007, which extended previous sanctions.
The resolution called upon all states to exercise vigilance and
restraint regarding the entry into or transit through their territories
of certain Iranians engaged in or associated with Iran's proliferation-sensitive
nuclear activities. In addition, it provided another list of
Iranian entities involved in nuclear or ballistic missile activities
and entities whose funds or assets shall be frozen. Among these
was one of the largest banks in Iran. Resolution 1747 also stated
that Iran shall not supply, sell, or transfer any arms or related
materiel. Furthermore, it called upon all states to exercise
vigilance and restraint in the supply, sale, or transfer of any
battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, large caliber artillery
systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles,
or missile systems. Finally, the resolution asked all states
and international financial institutions not to enter into new
commitments for grants, financial assistance, and concessional
loans to the Iranian government. As in the previous case, the
resolution asked the Director General of the IAEA to prepare
a report within 60 days as to whether Iran had complied with
the demands of Resolutions 1737 and 1747. Iranian officials were
defiant and shrugged off the effect of the resolutions. Yet Resolutions
1737 and 1747 put great pressure on Iran economically and politically,
setting the stage for further, and harsher, resolutions to follow.
The next Security Council sanction
resolution against Iran did not materialize until nearly a year
after Resolution 1747. On March 3, 2008, the Security Council
passed its third sanction resolution against Iran, Resolution
1803.[2] The new resolution tightens two previously passed sanction
acts by 1) asking states to exercise "vigilance and restraint"
against a new set of Iranian nationals purportedly involved in
"proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development
of nuclear-weapon delivery systems"; 2) extending the freezing
of the financial assets of persons or entities allegedly "supporting"
the above mentioned activities; 3) calling upon states to "exercise
vigilance over the activities of financial institutions in their
territories with all banks domiciled in Iran, in particular with
Bank Melli and Bank Saderat"; and 4) continuing to block
the import and export of allegedly "sensitive nuclear material
and equipment."
Resolution 1803 also added
a new provision to the previous sanction acts: it called upon
states to "inspect cargo to and from Iran of aircraft and
vessels owned or operated by Iran Air Cargo and Islamic Republic
of Iran Shipping Line, provided 'reasonable grounds' existed
to believe that the aircraft or vessel was transporting prohibited
goods." This new provision is one of the most dangerous
provisions in all the resolutions that have been passed so far
by the Security Council against Iran. The term "Reasonable
grounds" is ambiguous. What is reasonable or unreasonable
is in the eye of the beholder. Thus, theoretically, any adversary
of Iran can now stop an Iranian aircraft or vessel to inspect
it because it is "believed" there is "reasonable
grounds" for such an inspection. If the Iranian vessel refuses
inspection, all hell could break loose.
The new provision was probably
one of the reasons why four non-permanent members of the Security
Council, Indonesia, Libya, South Africa and Vietnam, tried in
vain to stop, revise or at least slow down the passage of Resolution
1803. At the end, however, under pressure from the US and its
allies, three of the four countries caved in and went along with
the resolution. The fourth, Indonesia, abstained. US and its
allies, who wanted unanimous vote against Iran in the Security
Council, and wished for a much harsher resolution, declared victory
nevertheless. But this was not enough. A day after, US, France
and Britain tried to introduce another resolution against Iran
at the meeting of the IAEA. This time, however, Russia, China
and a number of countries belonging to the Non-Aligned Movement
(NAM) stopped the effort and argued that given the action by
the Security Council a day earlier, a new resolution against
Iran would be superfluous.
All this happened against the
backdrop of two major reports undermining the necessity of passing
a third sanction resolution against Iran. The first was the November
2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) report, entitled "Iran:
Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities."[3] The "Key Judgments"
portion of the report that was made public stated:
We judge with high confidence
that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program;
we also assess with moderate-to-high confidence that Tehran at
a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons.
We judge with high confidence that the halt, and Tehran's announcement
of its decision to suspend its declared uranium enrichment program
and sign an Additional Protocol to its Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty Safeguards Agreement, was directed primarily in response
to increasing international scrutiny and pressure resulting from
exposure of Iran's previously undeclared nuclear work.
The report, of course, claimed
that Iran had exerted "considerable effort from at least
the late 1980s to 2003 to develop such [nuclear] weapons."
But the assertion that such efforts had been halted in 2003 not
only removed the rationale for the US and Israel to wage a military
campaign against Iran but it apparently slowed down the attempt
to pass a third sanction act through the Security Council. Indeed,
the resolution which passed recently was supposed to have been
passed in early summer of 2007. But almost immediately after
the conclusion of the NIE report became public the US government,
as well as its allies, belittled or even dismissed its value,
and, in so doing, made the passage of a new sanction resolution
against Iran appear to be urgent.
The second report that undermined
the urgency of the 3rd round of UN sanctions was the IAEA report.[4]
The summary of the report stated that
The Agency has been able to
continue to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material
in Iran. Iran has provided the Agency with access to declared
nuclear material and has provided the required nuclear material
accountancy reports in connection with declared nuclear material
and activities. Iran has also responded to questions and provided
clarifications and amplifications on the issues raised in the
context of the work plan, with the exception of the alleged studies.
Iran has provided access to individuals in response to the Agency's
requests. Although direct access has not been provided to individuals
said to be associated with the alleged studies, responses have
been provided in writing to some of the Agency's questions.
The summary also stated that
the "Agency has been able to conclude that answers provided
by Iran, in accordance with the work plan, are consistent with
its findings." But, the summary also added, the "one
major remaining issue relevant to the nature of Iran's nuclear
programme is the alleged studies on the green salt project, high
explosives testing and the missile re-entry vehicle." According
to the report, the documents related the allegations were only
shown to Iran in February, as late as just a few days before
the IAEA report. Iran the report states, "maintained that
these allegations are baseless and that the data have been fabricated."
The Agency, the report stated, is examining the allegations and
the statements provided by Iran.
The allegations apparently
refer to the content of the "stolen laptop" that the
US had in its possession and supposedly showed Iran's plans to
build a nuclear warhead.[5] The content of this mysterious laptop
had resurfaced a number of times before and its authenticity
questioned by a number of sources, including IAEA's own experts.
For example, on February 22, 2007, the Guardian reported
that, according to "informed sources" at the IAEA,
"most of the tip-offs about supposed secret weapons sites
provided by the CIA and other US intelligence agencies have led
to dead ends when investigated by IAEA inspectors." The
report quoted an IAEA "diplomat" as saying: "Most
of it has turned out to be incorrect. . . They gave us a paper
with a list of sites. [The inspectors] did some follow-up, they
went to some military sites, but there was no sign of [banned
nuclear] activities." The report then referred to the mysterious
"stolen laptop" that the US had in its possession and
supposedly showed Iran's "plans to build a nuclear warhead."
As the report pointed out, in "July 2005, US intelligence
officials showed printed versions of the material to IAEA officials,
who judged it to be sufficiently specific to confront Iran."
But the report pointed out that IAEA officials doubted the authenticity
of the laptop. "First of all," the Guardian quoted
one such official as saying, "if you have a clandestine
programme, you don't put it on laptops which can walk away [Moreover,
the] data is all in English which may be reasonable for some
of the technical matters, but at some point you'd have thought
there would be at least some notes in Farsi. So there is some
doubt over the provenance of the computer." A similar report
appeared on February 25, 2007, in the Los Angeles Times under
the heading "U.N. Calls U.S. Data on Iran's Nuclear Aims
Unreliable." The report quoted a "senior diplomat at
the IAEA" as saying: "Since 2002, pretty much all the
intelligence that's come to us [by way of the CIA and other Western
spy services] has proved to be wrong." This report, too,
pointed out that some IAEA officials doubted the authenticity
of the laptop story.
Had IAEA officials changed
their minds? Was there more to this report than had been divulged
before? Or was the intense pressure exerted on the IAEA by the
US and its allies, including repeated calls by the US and Israel
to remove the IAEA Director, Dr. ElBaradei, resulted in the IAEA
changing its position about the authenticity of the allegations?
Given the number of false claims made by the US and its allies-which
I have documented in my book-and given the intense pressure that
the IAEA has been under to produce results agreeable to Iran's
adversaries, one cannot help but to suspect that story of the
mysterious laptop might be another fabrication.
Whatever the nature of the
US allegations, one thing is certain: even if the threat of military
attack against Iran by the US, Israel or both has subsided for
the time being, sanctioning of Iran has not. US unilateral sanctions,
as well UN multilateral sanctions, are being intensified. Iran
is clearly feeling the pain of numerous sanctions. It is, however,
uncertain whether this pain is sufficient for Iran to relinquish
its "inalienable right" to "develop research,
production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without
discrimination," as guaranteed under Article IV of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty. The fact that after three rounds of
UN sanctions Iran is still cooperating with the IAEA shows that
Iran is bending under the pressure. But even if Iran does forfeit
its right and capitulates, it is uncertain whether the US and
Israel would stop their attempts to contain Iran. If containment
means the destruction of any country that stands in the way of
US and Israel, the fate of Iran might be similar to that of Iraq;
ultimately an excuse will be found to do to Iran what was done
to Iraq. The advocates of the dual containment policy, particularly
those who had argued that Iran should be contained before Iraq,
have been relentless. They will not stop until they achieve the
ultimate containment of Iran.
Sasan Fayazmanesh is chair of the Department of Economics
at California State University, Fresno. He can be reached at:
sasan.fayazmanesh@gmail.com
Notes
[1] This essay is based on
the Introduction of my book: http://www.routledgemiddleeaststudies.com/
[2] The text of Resolution
1803 is available at: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2008/sc9268.doc.htm
[3] The text of the report
is available at:
http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20071203_release.pdf
[4] The text of the report
is available at: http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2008/gov2008-4.pdf
[5] For more details about
the "laptop" see my book, The United States and
Iran, and a recent article by Gareth Porter, "Iran Nuke
Laptop Data Came from Terror Group," February 29, 2008:
http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=41416.
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