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CounterPunch
February
13, 2003
CIA Officer on the
Agency's Days of Shame
George Tenet
Caves In
By RAY McGOVERN
Former CIA analyst
Gas masks, so insiders joke bitterly, were issued
this week to analysts at CIA headquarters in Langley. Not because
of Code Orange, but to help staunch the stench. The analysts
have been holding their noses ever since CIA Director George
Tenet's February 11 testimony to the Senate Intelligence Committee.
Tenet caved in to administration pressure
to establish a link between Iraq and al-Qaeda. Equally important,
he retracted key intelligence judgments of barely four months
ago on Iraq.
As I watched the TV cameras pan Tenet
sitting like a potted plant behind Secretary of State Colin Powell
during Powell's briefing at the UN on February 5, the subliminal
message came through loud and clear: the CIA stands, or sits,
four-square behind what Powell is saying.
Never mind that CIA analysts and the
president's father's national security adviser, Gen. Brent Scowcroft,
consider the evidence tying Iraq to al-Qaeda "scant."
Never mind that a British intelligence report described by Powell
as "exquisite," was based mostly on an old paper of
a US graduate student.
When the cameras turned their focus away
from Powell and Tenet to Powell's briefing screen, I imagined
that Tenet need to hold his own nose. His testimony to the Senate
committee suggests, though, that he did not wince once.
Briefing the Senators, Tenet demonstrated
high tolerance for cooking intelligence to the recipe of policy-a
tolerance much higher than that of his analysts, who have been
taken in by the verse chiseled into the marble at the entrance
to CIA Headquarters-"And you shall know the truth, and the
truth shall set you free.".
With no evident embarrassment, the CIA
director backtracked on key judgments on Iraq that he gave the
Senate committee in a letter of October 7, 2001. Those conclusions
were call-them-as-you-see-them judgments in the best tradition
objective CIA analysis. But, alas, they caused much reflux pain
at the White House and Pentagon among those who prefer to damn
the torpedoes and press full speed ahead to invade Iraq.
Tenet's October 7 letter asserted, for
example, that the probability is low that Iraq would initiate
an attack with weapons of mass destruction or give them to terroristsUNLESS:
"Should Saddam conclude that a U.S.-led attack could no
longer be deterred, he probably would become much less constrained
in adopting terrorists action."
An inconvenient judgment, to say the
least, for those pressing for precisely such an attack.
Since Tenet adduced no credible reporting
warranting change in that judgment, his decision to blow smoke
when questioned on this key point was astounding-and, for CIA
analysts, demoralizing in the extreme. Tenet is fortunate that
CIA's Inspector General is an old crony and that so many CIA
analysts have mortgages and kids in college. Otherwise, the outrage
among analytic ranks would spell revolution.
With his February 11 testimony Tenet
wins the dubious distinction of joining the club of predecessor
CIA directors who, in the words of the widely respected CIA alumnus/historian,
Harold Ford, "felt they had to adjust what might be called
'pure' intelligence judgments to 'practical' political considerations,
lest they lose their place at the president's table."
Who does lose? The integrity of the intelligence
process is one casualty. But the real losers are the young men
and women we send into battle and whose names we later chisel
into a wall.
Take Vietnam, for example. In early 1967,
CIA analysts, led by young analyst Sam Adams demonstrated that
there were more than twice as many Vietnamese Communist forces
as the US military listed on its books. General William Westmoreland's
staff had reduced the numbers for political reasons.
The general was adamant, so CIA Director
Helms caved. In November 1967 Helms signed and gave to President
Johnson a formal National Intelligence Estimate enshrining the
Army's count of between 188,000 and 208,000 for enemy strength.
My CIA analyst colleagues were aghast; their best estimate was
500,000.
Had Helms told the truth, the war could
have ended much sooner. But it dragged on for seven more years,
filling the entire left half of the Vietnam Memorial in Washington
with the names of those killed or missing in action.
I have a vivid memory of Sam Adams telling
me at the time of a comment made to him by one of the most senior
CIA officials. "Have we gone beyond the bounds of reasonable
dishonesty?" he asked. "We" had indeed.
The question speaks volumes regarding
the willingness of senior agency officials to politicize intelligence
analysis at a time when it is critically necessary to speak truth
to power-a time like now. Déjà vu.
Ray McGovern
was a CIA analyst for 27 years and is on the Steering Group of
Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity. He is co-director
of the Servant Leadership School, an outreach ministry in the
inner city of Washington. He can be reached at: mcgovern@counterpunch.org.
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