|
CounterPunch
January
23, 2003
Dangerous Portents
India's Nuclear
War Plans
by N.D. JAYAPRAKASH
Two concurrent pronouncements made on 4 January
2003 - one, a major policy decision by the Government of India's
Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) and the other, a pious wish
expressed by the President of India, Dr. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam -
are ominous signs of the perilous future that lies ahead. The
brief Press Release issued by the Prime Minister's Office (PMO)
stated that the CCS had "met
today to review the progress in operationaizing of India's nuclear
doctrine." One wondered what "nuclear doctrine"
the CCS was operationaizing? This doubt arose because, one was
only aware of a 'Draft Nuclear Doctrine' (DND) that was propounded
on 17 August 1999, when the National Security Advisor, Mr. Brajesh
Mishra, in his capacity as Convenor of the National Security
Advisory Board (NSAB), had released "the
document for public discussion and debate". The observations
that Mr. Mishra had made while releasing the DND document is
very significant especially in the present context.
Mr. Mishra had then said: "I am
happy to present to you the draft of the Nuclear Doctrine prepared
by the National Security Board. We have decided to make this
document public in keeping with our position in favour of greater
transparency in decision-making. Please note that this is a draft
proposed by the NSAB and has not yet been approved by the Government.
That will have to wait until after the general elections."(Ibid.)
Mr. Mishra had explicitly stated that the Government favoured
"greater transparency in decision-making" and that
the proposed draft had "not yet been approved by the Government".
Mr. Mishra was well aware that the BJP-led Government then could
not have approved the DND because it had lost its mandate to
govern and was holding office only temporarily. It was the duty
of the next elected government to set the process in motion.
No Debate
While analysing the CCS' decision in
the light of the statements that Mr. Mishra had made earlier,
three important questions follow:
(1) When and in which forums and to what
extent has public discussion and debate taken place on this critical
national issue and what, if any, was the outcome? ;
(2) If not, why did the Government decide
to finalise and approve the DND without public discussion, debate
or notice? ; and
(3) Where is the promised transparency
in decision making when vital decisions having crucial bearing
on the lives of the entire population of the nation are taken
surreptitiously?
It is therefore incumbent on the Government
to explain its precipitate action on an issue of great national
importance and which is bound to have far wider ramifications.
The opposition parties in India are yet to take the Government
to task on this issue.
The promised "public discussion
and debate" on the DND did not take place probably because
the Government developed cold feet out of fear that the likely
outcome of such a debate would be quite contrary to their expectations.
May be it was apprehensive that the questionable proposals in
the DND would have found few takers. If the Government had any
confidence at all that the proposals are just and well-grounded,
there was absolutely no reason why it should have shied away
from a public debate on the issue. It is becoming increasingly
clear that in the name of defending "national security"
the right-wing BJP-dominated Government is merely trying to pursue
its sectarian agenda for partisan ends. By surreptitiously approving
what may be the propounded Draft Nuclear Doctrine almost verbatim
the Government has set a very dangerous precedent both in terms
of the procedure adopted for formulating the policy as well as
the substance of the policy itself.
The most shocking proposal in the DND
was about the necessity of cultivating "the
will to employ nuclear weapons and forces". This was
the core proposal around which rest of the DND had evolved. But
any use of nuclear weapons would necessarily result in wanton
destruction of lives and property. However, conscientious human
beings would have found even a mindless thought of committing
such genocide absolutely revolting. So the authours of the DND
have come up with a bizarre solution: they thought it was imperative
to inculcate the much-needed pernicious will for perpetrating
a horrendous crime against humanity. Injection of insensitivity
into the thought processes of sane human beings was an intrinsic
requirement for pursuing that objective. Essentially it would
entail de-humanisation of the individuals involved in the execution
of the dreaded decision, those who would have otherwise retained
their humanness. (Is this kind of moulding of the thought process
any different from that of the of terrorists who are conditioned
to indulge in senseless killing of unarmed and innocent civilians?)
It may also entail taking of appropriate steps to ensure that
the pernicious "will" percolates down to the mass of
people so that they endorse despicable decisions as a matter
of necessity or inevitability. (At a micro level, the attempt
to condone and accept the unprecedented communal violence in
Gujarat through a process of internalisation is a classic example.
Committing large-scale atrocities - arson, rape and murder -
were nothing to be ashamed of; they are acts that have become
a matter of "gaurav" or pride.) The DND was, thus,
essentially a document that sanctified and sanitised the use
of nuclear weapons. In short, it is a doctrine for fighting a
nuclear war, not for preventing one!
The justification offered for formulating
such a policy was that these weapons of mass destruction would
be used only in a retaliatory strike, which, in the words of
the CCS, "will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable
damage" (PMO, op cit.) on the adversary. If that is so,
it is again an admission that possessing nuclear weapons would
neither deter the adversary from launching a nuclear strike nor
protect Indians from being victims of such an attack. The utter
fallacy of the doctrine of 'nuclear deterrence' thereby stands
completely exposed. None of the proponents of this doctrine have
argued that stockpiling of nuclear weapons can actually prevent
a catastrophe. All they are claiming is that they can compound
such a catastrophe several times over through a retaliatory strike!
Deterrence is bound to breakdown at some point because deterrence
is always accompanied by nuclear one-upmanship, which necessarily
results in a never-ending upward spiralling nuclear arms race
with the spectre of a catastrophe remaining ever imminent. If
India was likely to be targeted in a nuclear first strike, why
is the Government cagey about the huge scale of death and destruction
that Indians might suffer if such a calamitous strike were to
take place? Is there an acceptable level of damage that Indians
can be made to suffer? If possession of nuclear weapons cannot
protect Indians from being victims of a nuclear attack, what
exactly is the purpose or advantage in possessing these dreadful
weapons of mass destruction?
Are the Indian victims of a nuclear attack
supposed to find solace in the fact that in a retaliatory strike
far greater number of people residing in the state of the aggressor
would be killed? Is a highly deplorable act to be avenged by
carrying out yet another equally deplorable act against a mass
of people who had had absolutely no role in the decision to initiate
the first nuclear strike? Every aggressor deserves to be punished
stringently. But is the aggressor an entire people or the decision-makers
in the concerned state? Who has to be punished? Retaliation is
against whom? Moreover, there is a serious problem about identifying
the Aggressor State since India can be targeted from any point
on Earth with Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) or
Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs), which are in the
possession of several nuclear weapon states. (It may be noted
that except China and India none of the other nuclear weapon
states have given even a No-First-Use pledge.) This being the
case, is Pakistan the fixed target for a retaliatory strike irrespective
of who the aggressor is? Any way, why is this undue emphasis
on retaliation and revenge instead of being more concerned about
preventing a nuclear war and on saving those millions of precious
Indian lives (which will certainly be lost in a nuclear first
strike or subsequent strikes) in the first place?
An active UN and the UN alone can effectively
contain any potential threat from an irrational power. The problem
is that there is a concerted attempt to hijack the UN and to
prevent it from acting to its full potential. Unless this problem
is urgently remedied by the mass of UN members and a concerted
attempt is made to uphold the laudable goals enshrined in the
UN Charter, the world will always be in the grip of one crisis
to the other.
India's current nuclear war strategy
is akin to the senseless policy of Mutually Assured Destruction
- or what was more appropriately called the MAD policy - that
USA and the Soviet Union (now Russia) have pursued. In fact,
Mr. George Fernandes, India's controversial Defence Minister,
told newspersons on 7 January 2003 that: "...if the [Indian]
deterrent is not adequate and Pakistan uses the bomb, we will
suffer a little but there will be no Pakistan left later"
(see 'The Hindu', Delhi, 8 January 2003). It may be recalled
that Mr. Fernandes had made a similar statement just a year back
(see 'The Hindustan Times', Delhi, 30 December 2001). The shrill
rhetoric from the Pakistani side too was almost on the same lines.
Pakistan's
Reaction
Pakistan, which had set up its 'Nuclear
Command Authority' on 2 February 2000, was never averse to making
boastful claims. Pakistan's President, General Pervez Musharraf,
on 13 December 2002 gloated that his country's armed forces had
earned the distinction of "defeating the enemy without fighting
a war" in the recent escalation of tensions between India
and Pakistan (see 'The Hindu', Delhi, 14 December 2002). Subsequently,
while addressing Air Force veterans in Karachi on 30 December
2002, President Musharraf had reportedly said: "I personally
conveyed messages to Prime Minister Vajpayee through every international
leader who came to Pakistan that if Indian troops moved a step
across the international border or the Line of Control, they
should not expect a conventional war from Pakistan. I believe
my message was effectively conveyed to Mr. Vajpayee" (see
'The Hindu', Delhi, 31 December 2002). The mass media had immediately
interpreted the President's allusion as holding out a nuclear
threat. While the spokesperson of the Pakistan President, Rashid
Qureshi, maintained that President Musharraf did not talk about
a nuclear war, the clarification later issued by the President
himself leaves little doubt about what he had actually meant.
Accusing the media of misinterpreting
his remarks on an "unconventional" war with India,
the Pakistan President told reporters in Islamabad on 3 January
2003 that: "This is a distortion and I have been misquoted.
No one in his right state of mind can talk of a nuclear war."
(So far so good, but what he said subsequently nevertheless betrayed
his real intentions.) The President had gone on to add that he
was, in fact, at that time talking in the context of Kashmir
and had said that if any one tried to cross the Line of Control
then there would be a 'guerrilla warfare' (see 'The Hindu', Delhi,
4 January 2003). President Musharraf's explanation hardly makes
any sense since the Indian army, which was ready to confront
the regular Pakistani army, could not have been deterred by the
threat of guerrilla warfare! Any way the Indian army was already
fighting such a war on the Indian side of the Line of Control.
Thus, President Musharraf's claim that he was misquoted is not
very convincing.
Indeed, if as President Musharraf says
'No one in his right state of mind can talk of a nuclear war',
the best way for Pakistan to remove any such misapprehension
is by giving an undertaking of No First Use of nuclear weapons.
This step can be followed immediately by a No War Pact between
the two neighbours in order to prevent outbreak of any war -
both 'conventional' as well as 'unconventional' types, including
what is called 'cross-border terrorism'. However, what is happening
today is that the leadership of both the nations is currently
indulging in the game of nuclear brinkmanship, which poses a
grave threat to the lives of the people of the two countries.
Although India has unilaterally given a No First Use pledge,
in reality the pledge has become a mere mask behind which feverish
preparations are going on for conducting an all out nuclear war
(against Pakistan of course). This is apparent in the original
DND itself. (According to the "India Abroad" weekly,
the Third NSAB has recommended the abandonment of the No-First-Use
pledge. This disturbing news appears credible since the CCS
has already sought to dilute the pledge.) The fact that Pakistan
refuses to follow a NFU policy also creates serious doubts regarding
its real intentions.
The only difference in the approach of
the two sides is that, on the one hand, the Pakistani leadership
practically appears to eulogise hara-kiri by claiming that "the
140 million people of Pakistan are fully prepared to face all
consequences with all their might" (see 'The Week', Kochi,
6 January, 2002). On the other hand, the Indian side harps on
the inevitability of winning the nuclear war despite a "little"
suffering in the process (see Mr. Fernandes' statement of 6 January
2003 quoted above). In terms of numbers "little" would
actually mean several million Indian casualties. With hundreds
of millions of casualties on both sides what a victory that would
be! Thankfully, it appears that the Pakistani side is now trying
to tone down the rhetoric.
In response to Mr. Fernandes' comment
that India could absorb a nuclear hit and annihilate Pakistan
in return, Pakistan's information Minister, Mr. Sheikh Rashid
Ahmed, reportedly said: "We will not initiate nuclear war,
and this is our policy" (Associated Press report quoted
in 'The Hindu', Delhi, 9 January 2003). If Mr. Ahmed's statement
is the current stand of the Pakistani Government, it indeed is
a very welcome move. In that case Pakistan should have no hesitation
in formally adhering to the policy of No First Use, which would
be a major step towards reducing nuclear tensions between the
two neighbours. A No First Use pledge need not be anything more
than an expression of intent. But it would be a major Confidence
Building Measure (CBM) that could open up the possibilities of
more meaningful preventive measures. The Pakistan President,
Gen. Musharaf, has also tried to discount the possibility of
an accidental nuclear war from the Pakistani side by claiming
that "Missiles and [nuclear] warheads are not permitted
together. There is a geographical separation between them"
(see 'The Hindu', Delhi, 11 January 2003).
A New Twist
In the CCS' statement, two new elements
have been introduced into the No First Use posture. Firstly,
in the original DND retaliation would have been in response to
"any nuclear attack on India and its forces" (para
2.3b, DND, op cit.) The same has now been modified to mean that
nuclear weapons will be used "in retaliation against a nuclear
attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere"
(PMO, op cit.). That Indian forces are going to be "anywhere"
is certainly a revelation. The Government owes an explanation
to the Indian people as to what it means. It certainly cannot
mean peacekeeping missions under the aegis of the United Nations,
because Indian forces during such missions have not so far been
engaged in any peace breaking activities unlike the US forces.
There is absolutely no reason why Indian forces, which engages
itself in credible peace making activities, should come under
a nuclear attack. (But any likely military deployment abroad
by India, which is outside the pale of the UN, would be questionable
and should not be undertaken in the first place.)
Secondly, unlike the DND, the CCS states
that "in the event of a major attack against India, or Indian
forces anywhere, by biological or chemical weapons, India will
retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons" (ibid.).
This is again a very questionable posture. Does this mean that
if there is a major chemical disaster for which say a US multinational
company (e.g. Union Carbide Corporation in the Bhopal gas leak
disaster of December 1984) is culpable, will the Government of
India then consider the option of targeting the United States
with nuclear weapons? How will discretion be exercised? Effectively,
this posture would mean that India is going back on its No-First-Use
pledge. When chemical or biological agents are released by firing
artillery shells it may not be difficult to identify the aggressor.
But the magnitude of the damage that could be inflicted through
such a process would be very limited and cannot even theoretically
justify a nuclear response. Under other circumstances, identifying
the aggressor is going to be quite problematic just as in the
case of a nuclear attack. A nuclear response to any situation
might be a very convenient belligerent stance but that would
only compound the problem and can never bring about any solution.
All types of terrorism can be contained ones its global links
are severed. What is required is international co-operation in
eliminating the menace; there is no other short cut.
In an attempt to tone down the bellicosity,
the CCS has reiterated that it would remain committed to: (1)
"Non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states";
and (2) "A continuance of strict controls on export of nuclear
and missile materials and technologies, participation in the
Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty negotiations, and continued observance
of the moratorium on nuclear tests". That the Government
has chosen to standby these commitments is a sign of sobriety.
The CCS also re-emphasised India's "Continued commitment
to the goal of a nuclear weapon free world, through global, verifiable
and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament" (ibid.). However,
if this laudatory pronouncement was not followed up with concrete
action, there is a high propensity that the same would become
a mere cover for concealing aggressive nuclear war plans. To
assume that the onus of pursuing the goal of global nuclear disarmament
is that of someone else is a convenient way of passing the buck
and to quietly shy away from taking on the responsibility.
Itching for
War
The CCS, which announced the setting
up of a Nuclear Command Authority - a two-tier body consisting
of a Political Council and an Executive Council - has tried to
imply that India is a responsible nuclear weapon power. It has
claimed that only the "Political Councilchaired by the Prime
Minister" (ibid) [hopefully meaning the elected leadership]
of the country can take the dreaded decision to initiate a nuclear
strike. But this announcement is hardly reassuring considering
the fact that it was an elected government in the United States
that took the reprehensible decision to use nuclear weapons on
Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 when an already defeated
Japan was on the verge of surrender. While the ultimate decision
to use the horrendous weapon may rest with the civilian leadership,
the fact is that effective control over nuclear weapons as expected
would remain with the military. A Strategic Forces Command has
already been set up for the purpose and the CCS has appointed
a Commander-in-Chief for the same to manage and administer all
strategic forces.
The CCS also indicated that it has "reviewed
and approved the arrangements for alternate chains of command
for retaliatory nuclear strikes in all eventualities" (ibid.).
The way this statement has been formulated underlines the cold
and insensitive manner in which the proponents of the nuclear
doctrine are treating the issue. That the Prime Minister of the
country could get knocked out in the very first nuclear strike
is presented as just a matter-of-fact. That millions of Delhiites
would perish along with the PM is left unsaid because it is of
little consequence. The whole emphasis is on ensuring that there
would be a 'next-in-command' who would be empowered to give the
deadly signal for a retaliatory strike. It is as though the authors
of this abhorrent doctrine are hoping that someone (preferably
Pakistan) would carry out a nuclear first strike on India so
they can retaliate in a manner that would "inflict unacceptable
damage" on the aggressor. They are just itching to retaliate
because their entire focus is on retaliation and not on initiating
concrete steps towards preventing a nuclear war.
The saddest part is that the urgency
of preventing a nuclear war has become a non-issue as far as
the CCS was concerned. They are content to pay ritualistic lip
service to the cause of nuclear disarmament and to do little
else. On the contrary, the stress is on "overall preparedness"
of the "existing command and control structures, the state
of readiness, the targeting strategy for a retaliatory attack,
and operating procedures for various stages of alert and launch"
(ibid.). Any reference to India's long held principled stand
that 'the use of nuclear weapons constitutes a violation of the
UN Charter and a crime against humanity' is consciously avoided.
In fact the very phrase "to prevent use of nuclear weapons"
was completely missing from the entire text of even the original
DND! 'Nuclear war-fighting' is the strategy that has now captured
the imagination of the CCS'.
"Space
Force"
Another matter that has caused concern
is the proposal put forward inadvertently by the President of
India, Dr. Abdul Kalam. In a speech titled "Vision
for the Global Space Community: Prosperous, Happy and Secure
Planet Earth" that was delivered at the Space Summit
of the 90th Session of the Indian Science Congress at Bangalore
on 4 January 2003, Dr. Kalam, spoke of the need for an "International
Space Force". While it is very evident that the President
had not referred to the Space Force with any sinister motive,
the implications of his suggestion would actually be quite contrary
to what he had in mind. Dr. Kalam had correctly recognised "the
necessity for the world's Space community to avoid terrestrial
geo-political conflict to be drawn into outer space, thus threatening
the space assets belonging to all mankind". The President
had also expressed his eagerness "to protect world space
assets in a manner which will enable peaceful use of space on
a global co-operative basis without the looming threat of conflict
on earth". But the "International Space Force"
that Dr. Kalam wants to establish would itself become the biggest
stumbling block in the way of attaining the important objectives
that he has highlighted. On the other hand, what was required
was not the setting up of a group of "protectors" but
the total de-militarisation of space so that all assets could
be preserved and shared in a co-operative manner for the benefit
of all humankind.
The biggest threat that is looming large
today is the concerted attempt of the United States to militarise
space in a bid to impose its will over the rest of humanity.
Under the circumstances, the danger is that any attempt to create
an "International Space Force" may in the end just
turn out to be a mere euphemism for a "US Space Force".
The President's noble vision to enable "peaceful use of
space on a global co-operative basis" would then remain
only a pipe dream. It is in this context that the President's
suggestion appears alarming. The apprehension seems well justified
considering the fact that India has held a two-day official level
talks with the United States on the so-called Missile Defence
on 15-16 January 2003. These talks were a continuation of two
rounds of discussions held in May 2001 and May 2002. It may be
recalled that in total contravention of its principled stand
against militarisation of space, the Government of India on 2
May 2001 became the first major government to declare tacit support
to the "Missile Defence" system propounded by the US
Administration. It marked a major break from India's purported
policy of Non-Alignment. The "Missile Defence" system
is very much an integral part of the US strategic framework to
militarise space through its preposterous "Star War"
plans. By opting to play second fiddle to the US in this sinister
programme, the Government of India has completely compromised
the vital interests of the country. If the grotesque plan ever
gets going the mass of humanity will be forced to pay a heavy
price.
A Sharp Contrast
The questionable policies that the Government
of India is pursuing at home and at a bilateral level is in sharp
contrast to the forthright policies it has been upholding in
several international fora, especially in the United Nations.
India's Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament,
Mr Rakesh Sood, while speaking at the 57th Session of the First
Committee of the UN General Assembly on 7 October 2002, had made
the following announcement. He stated that the Indian delegation
was "bringing before this committee yet again, as it has
done since 1982, the resolution calling for a convention to be
negotiated for prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear
weapons under any circumstances". Mr.Sood also said that:
"India's resolution entitled "Reducing
Nuclear Danger" will be presented to this committee
for the fifth consecutive year with the expectation that it will
receive wider support and convince those who are still skeptical
of the need for early concrete action" .
The UN General Assembly adopted the two
above-mentioned resolutions on 22 November 2002 with the support
of both India and Pakistan. The resolution for a 'Convention
on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons' (A/RES/57/94
) was passed by 110 to 45 votes with 12 abstentions (with the
entire NATO block and its supporters opposing it). While the
resolution on 'Reducing Nuclear Danger' (A/RES/57/84) was passed
by 107 to 46 votes with 17 abstentions. Both India and Pakistan
have extended support to yet another important resolution titled
"Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International
Court of Justice on the 'Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons'". The UN General Assembly adopted this resolution
(A/RES/57/85) also on 22 November 2002 by 161 to 4 votes with
1 abstention. (Those who voted against were France, Israel, Russia
and USA, while UK chose to abstain - leaving little doubt that
they are the five powers that constitute the biggest stumbling
block in way of global nuclear disarmament.) India and Pakistan
were also among the group of nations that sponsored and supported
the resolution (A/RES/57/57) on "Prevention of an Arms Race
in Outer Space", which was passed in the General Assembly
by 159 votes to 0 with 3 abstentions (Israel, Micronesia and
USA).
However, it is a little too premature
to be euphoric about the support that these resolutions have
received. As India's representative, Mr.Rakesh Sood, has pointed
out: "The political will necessary to kick-start the negotiations
of long awaited and future oriented disarmament treaties has
not been in evidence for yet another year. If we do not get our
act together, we are in danger of engaging in activities "full
of sound and fury, signifying nothing". He further added
that: "we need to shake ourselves out of our stupor and
take concrete initiatives that address both the issues that have
remained with us for long and those that have emerged in the
post--11 September 2001 context" (Mr. Sood's statement,
op cit.).
Stem the Drift
It is time that the Government of India
itself first took heed of Mr. Sood's plea. The point is that
both India and Pakistan have on the floor of the UN General Assembly
unequivocally supported several resolutions in favour of global
nuclear disarmament and against the arms race. They both claim:
(1) that they support a convention on
prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under
any circumstances;
(2) that they are ready to take all necessary
steps to reduce the nuclear danger;
(3) that the only defence against a nuclear
catastrophe is the total elimination of nuclear weapons;
(4) that they recognise the need to commence
negotiations for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons
with a specified framework of time; and
(5) that they are against an arms race
in outer space. Then why is it not possible for the two nations
to reiterate the same at a bilateral level on a joint platform?
Instead, what is happening is that, outside the four walls of
the UN and especially at home, the two neighbours are constantly
at loggerheads and rattling their nuclear sabre at each other.
(The rare exception is the 'Agreement
on the Prohibition of Attack Against Nuclear Installations and
Facilities between India and Pakistan', which was signed in 1988*.
As to why similar agreements cannot be signed bilaterally to
prevent a nuclear war or, for that matter, any war between the
two is inexplicable.) [*The agreement came into force in 1991.
Under the agreement, the two countries are to inform each other
on January 1 of every calendar year of the nuclear installations
and facilities to be covered by the Agreement. The 12th such
exchange took place on 1 January 2003. See 'TheHindu', Delhi,
2 January 2003]
It may not be an exaggeration to say
that the leaders in both India and Pakistan try to conceal from
their peoples as much as possible about their common and often
joint activities in the UN for furthering the cause of world
peace. Any way it cannot be denied that hardly any publicity
is given to these efforts. At home they are more pre-occupied
with rabble-rousing and little else. Demonisation of each other
caters to the wild passions of the religious right and conflating
hatred of the other community with defence of one's nation is
done so as to extract good dividends in domestic politics. By
refusing to initiate concrete action on the numerous issues on
which they have a common position, the leadership of the two
countries are only deceiving their own peoples. Unless the concerned
citizens of India and Pakistan rise up to put an end to this
mindless drift, a tragic end might not be too far away for a
sizeable section of humanity.
N.D. Jayaprakash
is a member of the Delhi Science Forum in Saket, New Delhi. He
can be reached at: jpdsf@hotmail.com
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the Vatican Part of the Axis of Evil?
Ray Hanania
Likud and Hamas: the Ties that Bind
Walt Brasch
Bush Dances with the Supremes
Carol Norris
Rumsfeld's Paradigm Shift
No Evidence is Evidence
Adam Engel
The Armageddon Jamboree
Anis Shivani
Is It Time to Move to Canada?
Krieger, Smith
Carson
Poets' Basement
Read
Whiteout and Find Out
How the CIA's Backing of the Mujahideen Created the World's Most
Robust Heroin Market and Helped to Finance the Rise of the Taliban
and Osama bin Laden
Whiteout:
CIA, Drugs & the
Press
by Alexander
Cockburn
and Jeffrey St. Clair
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