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April
26 / 27, 2003
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Cassel
The Other War: Bush, Ashcroft and
the End of Civil Liberties
Saul
Landau
Iraq War: a Policy of Christian and Jewish Fundamentalism
William
A. Cook
Sharon Recruits US as Mercenaries Against Syria
William
S. Lind
Now the Real War Starts
John Chuckman
In Jesus's Name:
Franklin Graham's Christian Empire
David
MacMichael and Ray McGovern
Ex-CIA Analysts on WMD: Where? Find?
Plant?
Gary Leupp
Why the War on Iraq was (and Remains) Wrong
Robert
Sandels
Cuba Crackdown: a Revolt Against Bush's National Security Strategy?
CounterPunch
Wire
An Open Letter to Jerry Brown on Oakland Police Violence Against
Peace Activists and Dock Workers
Mickey
Z.
Our Ba'athists
Anthony
Gancarski
Nader Plays Pullman
Scott
Handleman
The Mumia Abu-Jamal Case in Its True Colors
Claud Cockburn
Evelyn Waugh's Ear Trumpet
Poets'
Basement
Matt Simon, Sam Hamod, Hammond Guthrie and Stew Albert
Steve
Perry
Bush's War Web Log 4/26
April
25, 2003
David
Vest
It's Not the Oil; It's the Art!
Steven
Higgs
All About Tucker Carlson
Walt
Brasch
The Shock and Awe of American Ignorance
Alexander
Cockburn
The Decline of American Journalism:
the Case of Judy Miller
Zeynep
Toufe
A Letter to the People of Iraq from an Anti-War Activist
CounterPunch
Wire
Season of the Witch: Jeane Kirkpatrick Unbound
Hammond
Guthrie
Springtime in Iraq
Steve
Perry
Bush's War Web Log 4/25
Website
of the Day
Having
a Great Time, Wish You Were Here: Postcards from a War
April
24, 2003
Lois
Whitman
An Open Letter to Rumsfeld on the
Child Detainees at Guantanamo
Uri
Avnery
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David
Lindorff
Day Care in the Name of National Security? About Those Kids in
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John Grebe
Rev. Pat Robertson's Message in the Temple
Dokhi
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CounterPunch
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Our Man in Baghdad
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Do You Regret Being an American?
Harold
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April 29,
2003
Walking Into a Deadlock
Don't Envy Abu-Mazen
By URI AVNERY
My first impression of Abu-Mazen was of a serious,
methodical, somewhat aloof introvert. He reminded me of a high-school
principal, very different from Arafat, the impulsive extrovert,
prone to personal gestures, exuding warmth to all around him.
I met Abu-Mazen for the first time some
28 years ago. We were secretly in Tunis to meet Yasser Arafat.
There were three of us: Matti Peled, a general in the reserves,
Ya'acov Arnon, a former Director General of the Treasury and
I. We met Abu-Mazen first to prepare practical proposals for
joint actions, to be put before the "Old Man", as Arafat
- then 54--was called.
I had first heard mention of the name Abu-Mazen nine years earlier,
with my first secret contacts with senior PLO officials. They
told me that the Fatah leadership had appointed a committee of
three for contacts with Israelis. They were the "three Abus"
(as I called them): Abu-Amar (Yasser Arafat), Abu-Iyad (Salah
Halaf) and Abu-Mazen (Mahmud Abbas).
Abu-Mazen was directly responsible for
the contacts that started in 1974. At the first stage, they were
conducted with me personally, but, from the autumn of 1976 on,
the Israeli partner was the "Israeli Council for Israeli-Palestinian
Peace". The Palestinians who met us were Sa'id Hamami and
Issam Sartawi--who were both murdered by the Iraqi-supported
Palestinian arch-terrorist, Abu-Nidal, a mortal enemy of Arafat.
When Arafat and Abu-Mazen were both present
at meetings with us, I got a clear picture of their mutual standing.
The detailed discussions were conducted by Abu-Mazen, who had
a good knowledge of things Israeli, but it was Arafat who, in
the end, made the decisions. More than once I had the impression
that the senior PLO leaders were quite content to leave to Arafat
the responsibility for the courageous, dangerous and unpopular
decisions that led up to the agreement with Israel.
Now there is a new situation. Arafat
has agreed to appoint Abu-Mazen Prime Minister. (The very fact
that the whole world, and Israel too, have welcomed the Palestinian
"government" and "Prime Minister" is a big
step towards the establishment of the State of Palestine. In
Oslo Israel still strenuously resisted terms like "President",
"government" and "parliament" for the Palestinians.)
Abu-Mazen has taken upon himself a great
responsibility vis-a-vis his own people and the world.
He has put himself in a well-nigh impossible position.
Sharon & Co. demand that he first
of all put an end to "terrorism" ("armed struggle"
in Palestinian parlance), liquidate the "terrorist organizations"
collect their arms and prevent "incitement". Only after
the successful completion of all this can real negotiations begin.
Freezing the construction of settlements, of course, should not
even be mentioned at this stage.
The Palestinian public, on the other
hand, demands that first of all the Israeli army should leave
the Palestinian towns, stopping "targeted assassinations",
settlement activity, the demolition of homes and all other acts
of oppression, and start real negotiations for the establishment
of the State of Palestine.
This threatens to become a deadlock.
If the US and Europe exert massive pressure
on Sharon, the way they have put massive pressure on Arafat,
the deadlock might be broken. The Israeli army would withdraw,
the situation in the Palestinian territories would change completely,
the Palestinians would be able to breathe again and Abu-Mazen
would appear as a leader who had already attained a great achievement.
The popularity of the extreme organizations would decline.
Even if this happened, Abu-Mazen could
not dream of making mass arrests, destroying the organizations
and confiscating their weapons. There is nothing the Palestinians
fear more than fratricidal war. However, the pressure of Palestinian
public opinion would lead, at least, to an effective armistice.
Even the extreme organizations are sensitive to the attitudes
of their public--if it wants quiet, there will be quiet. That
has already happened in the first period after the Oslo agreement.
Let's assume that this happens. The attacks
stop almost completely (there will always be some individuals
and local groups who feel they have to act on their own). The
Abu-Mazen government functions well in the Palestinian towns
and villages. Then what?
After the publication of the Road Map,
Sharon will propose dozens of "corrections". Even now
the "map" is strongly tilted towards Sharon. While
the Palestinians gave up 78% of the country in Oslo and accepted
the remaining 22% for building their own state, and have declared
that they want to live in peaceful co-existence with Israel,
Sharon talks about "painful concessions" without spelling
out what he really means.
If Sharon's "corrections" are
even partly accepted, the plan will lose most of what content
it still has. Abu-Mazen will stand there with empty hands, the
negotiations will stagnate as in previous rounds. Gradually,
the Palestinians will be forced to the conclusion that they can
achieve nothing without violence, the fighting organizations
will regain the initiative and the armed struggle will resume.
Sharon and Bush will blame the Palestinians,
of course. They will say that Abu-Mazen "has not delivered
the goods". The Palestinians, for their part, will say that
Abu-Mazen is naive, that he has fallen into an American-Israeli
trap. He will resign, Arafat's prestige will rise to new heights.
The next chapter can be foreseen. The
Christian fundamentalists and Zionist neo-cons, who control Washington
at this time, will demand that Sharon be given a free hand. The
Palestinians will embark on the third intifada, more extreme
than the two before. Blood and fire and columns of smoke.
It could be different. For example: the
US stops treating the Quartet with contempt, pressure is put
on Sharon, Bush is not reelected, the negotiations bear fruit,
the peace camp wins in Israel, the Palestinian state is founded
in peace.
In the Holy Land, miracles have happened
before.
But in the meantime, don't envy Abu-Mazen.
Yesterday's
Features
Elaine
Cassel
The Other War: Bush, Ashcroft and
the End of Civil Liberties
Saul
Landau
Iraq War: a Policy of Christian and Jewish Fundamentalism
William
A. Cook
Sharon Recruits US as Mercenaries Against Syria
William
S. Lind
Now the Real War Starts
John Chuckman
In Jesus's Name:
Franklin Graham's Christian Empire
David
MacMichael and Ray McGovern
Ex-CIA Analysts on WMD: Where? Find?
Plant?
Gary Leupp
Why the War on Iraq was (and Remains) Wrong
Robert
Sandels
Cuba Crackdown: a Revolt Against Bush's National Security Strategy?
CounterPunch
Wire
An Open Letter to Jerry Brown on Oakland Police Violence Against
Peace Activists and Dock Workers
Mickey
Z.
Our Ba'athists
Anthony
Gancarski
Nader Plays Pullman
Scott
Handleman
The Mumia Abu-Jamal Case in Its True Colors
Claud Cockburn
Evelyn Waugh's Ear Trumpet
Poets'
Basement
Matt Simon, Sam Hamod, Hammond Guthrie and Stew Albert
Steve
Perry
Bush's War Web Log 4/26
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